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1 Introduction1 
The new stage of globalisation associated with the changing relationship between 
finance, trade and production has entailed a changing context in North-South2 technology 
transfer contracts (Radosevic, 1999). The interacting context is not only shaped by both 
sides’ firms but by a wide range of external factors. On one hand, North companies are 
located in a well-established infrastructure, are advanced institutions and have a  
high-quality of manpower. In these circumstances, they are keen to shift to the global 
paradigms. On the other hand, South countries, despite the segmentation3 (Freeman and 
Hagedoorn, 1994) may suffer much loss of advanced infrastructures, institutions, and 
perhaps well-trained manpower. These contrasts make the interacting context complex 
and challenging. 
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This study analyses the complexity of the interacting context in a North-South 
contract by focusing on the positive and negative externalities of the process. It studies 
the case of compressed natural gas (CNG) project between Iran-Khodro and its German 
partner. They collaborated to design and manufacture the first bi-fuel engine in the world 
‘optimised’ for CNG operation as the primary fuel and petrol as the secondary fuel. The 
research is based on a case study method and, by going into great depth, enables the 
researcher to understand the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
and illuminate a particular situation (Yin, 2006). The author was the consultant of the 
project for three years enabling him to capture the important elements of the process as a 
participant observer. This opportunity gave the researcher access to documents and 
memos and interviews conducted with the Iranian project managers to obtain deep and 
rich data. All interviews were unstructured to allow the interviewee to give their 
observations and experiences about the external factors. The study shows how the 
interacting firms may stumble across unpredictable or uncontrollable externalities. It 
argues that international technology transfer projects do not occur in an isolated context, 
in which only two sides’ firms are involved, but that the context is shaped by many 
political, cultural, social and macro economic factors. Technology transfer process 
frequently occurs in a complex and dynamic context and embeds an extensive range of 
influencing factors that are present simultaneously. 
2 Theoretical framework 
“Technology transfer is the process connecting two or more technological systems for the 
transfer of know-how, information, devices, etc.” [Bugliarello, (1996), p.2]. Nowadays, 
the definition however has been contextualised within the concept of a knowledge-based 
economy. In the new perspective, technology transfer is perceived as a specific 
knowledge-transfer process between two or more economic agents in which the  
co-evolution of their absorptive capabilities and their knowledge-transmission strategies 
are the key elements of the process quality (Amesse and Cohendet, 2001). The firms of 
the developing countries typically look at the technology transfer from North countries as 
one of the mechanisms to stay abreast in rapid international competition and catch-up in 
specific fields of technologies. On the other hand, developed nations’ companies look at 
technology transfer as a way to create and develop new markets in order to sell products 
and gain economic benefit. Meanwhile, a broad range of both sides’ firms in terms of 
size, organisation and finance can be involved in the process. In some cases, even the 
governmental bodies are among the players and follow-up the issue due to political or 
economic reasons and hence the involved actors in the technology transfer process are at 
different levels. 
There have been many studies in the literature about the types, methods and 
efficiency of cross-border technology transfer contracts. Autio and Laamanen (1995) 
classified and discussed technology transfer mechanisms and indicators. They identified 
three main indicators as input, output, and process indicators. These issues have been 
addressed inside the relationship between two interacting firms but external influences 
were not considered in the study. Other authors (Niosi and Hanel, 1995; Kim, 1998; 
Amesse and Cohendet, 2001; Kim and Inkpen, 2005) have focused on the success or 
failure of technology transfer processes particularly in the catch-up context and 
highlighted the importance of absorptive capacity, which was originally developed by 
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Cohen and Levinthal (1990). The modern perspective paid much attention to bringing to 
light the role of capability/knowledge transfer. It emphasis that the significant part of 
technology is tacit and embodied in people and organisational routines and thus the 
efficient transfer of technology not only embeds transferral of equipment and information 
but also capabilities (Radosevic, 1999; Amesse and Cohendet, 2001). The differentiating 
element lies in the fact that technology cannot be merely transferred by a sell/buy 
contract but also depends heavily upon the ways interacting firms manage knowledge. 
In spite of the importance of knowledge management issues in technology transfer 
processes, it is important to understand that both sides’ firms are interacting within a 
complex context shaped by many social, cultural, political and other factors. Most of the 
studies on international technology transfer, especially on case studies, focus on micro 
level factors while other external meso/macro level influences are still seemingly missing 
from the literature. Niosi and Hanel (1995) highlight the important role of government of 
the host country in preparation of general and technical education and the legal, social 
and economic infrastructure which increases absorptive capacity of the transferor firm. 
Freeman and Hagedoorn (1994) showed that strategic technology partnerships or  
inter-firm technology transfer agreements do not necessarily entail catching-up by 
developing countries and even create a falling behind. Radosevic (1999) discussed 
technology transfer issues in the catch-up context. He argued that technology transfer 
policy options have changed in the period from the 1960s to the 1990s not only due to the 
change in the perception of knowledge elements of transfer but also due to globalisation 
which has been the dominant factor in changing the relationship between trade, finance, 
and production. Consequently, there is an increasing trend in technology transfer studies 
to highlight that the process is not implemented in an isolated context in which only two 
sides’ firms play, but that the context is also shaped by many political, cultural, social and 
macro economic factors. With respect to this, there has been interest among scholars to 
embody national innovation system literature into technology transfer studies. The 
concept of national innovation system originated by Freeman (1987) was supported by 
theoretical contribution of Lundvall (1992), by empirical case studies of Nelson (1993), 
by sectoral perspective of Breschi and Malerba (1997) and Malerba (2002, 2004) and 
slightly contextualised in technology transfer literature by Bugliarello (1996) and Niosi 
(2002). Malerba and Nelson (2007, p.4), comment that “firms do not act alone. They 
must be understood as operating in the context of innovation systems that includes other 
kinds of economic actors that are involved in supporting and orienting the dynamics of 
economic activity and innovation: financial systems, primary and secondary education, 
universities, the public research system and government programs.” Likewise, 
Bugliarello (1996) argue that the process of technology transfer, when occurs across 
national boundaries, is greatly influenced by the characteristics of two or more national 
systems of innovation. He also explains motivation and championship as the meta-factors 
which can affect technology transfer processes and illustrates how government’s 
motivation in engaging in technology transfer may be economic development, political 
expediency, or the enhancement of military strength. 
Along the same lines, Mowery (1995, p.539) elucidates the importance of the 
alignment between government policies and technology transfer policies in the success of 
the process. He argues that technology transfer policies “when coupled with policies 
supporting exports and investment in human and physical capital may produce greater 
technological and economic spill-over from foreign to domestic entrepreneurs and firms.” 
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However, despite insightfulness of the national innovation system concept in the 
technology transfer literature, it has some limitations in terms of perception  
and management of external influencing factors which are beyond the national 
boundaries. This might be the case, when a European firm interacts with a non-European 
firm where the atmosphere of interaction is conceivably shaped by European Union 
institutions. 
This paper will present the case of CNG project as a technology transfer from a  
North firm to a South firm. It mainly focuses on external factors and the context in  
which both sides interact with each other and shows how the political, economic,  
and contextual factors (of transferor) shape the dynamism. Figure 1 schematically  
shows the contexts shaped by a range of factors in which both parties interact.  
However, the main focus of this paper is to analyse those external factors which  
arise from the context of domestic firm. This is because in the case analysed in this  
paper, the innovation system in the domestic country was at national level while it was at 
firm level in the foreign country (Section 6). The influences might be associated from  
the economics (e.g., domestic market demands, export markets, preservation of  
the current market), institutions (e.g., intellectual property rights, investment laws), 
politics (e.g., sanctions), infrastructure (e.g., information and communication 
technologies), culture (e.g., type of interaction, values, devalues, behaviours), and 
environment (e.g., air pollution). Moreover, the influencing factors on the domestic firm 
not only affect the strategy of the transferee firm but also the strategy of the foreign firm. 
For instance, the institution of the domestic firm, such as intellectual property rights, may 
influence the strategy of the foreign firm particularly in the case of high-technology 
transfer contracts. 
Figure 1 Dynamic context of interaction in a North-South technology transfer contract  
(see online version for colours) 
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3 Project overview 
Iran-Khodro, the largest car manufacturer in the Middle East, set out to develop new 
products with new types of engines to suit demands for both domestic and overseas 
markets. Historically, Iran-Khodro has produced a limited range of product models that 
were mostly behind contemporary global technology in the automobile industry, and it 
seemed unlikely that they would be able to retain their current domestic market. The 
future will include many new competitors offering a broad range of products once Iran 
joins the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Membership of the WTO will not only result 
in standardisation and strengthening of intellectual property rights’ protection (discussed 
in the next section), but also realisation of an open door policy to the foreign products 
which incur removal of existing high tariffs in the car industry. Therefore, in order to 
maintain its current market, Iran-Khodro should develop a specific range of products that 
respond to domestic market demands which competitors will find difficult to match. 
The strategy was to develop an engine family with advanced technology to cover a 
wide range of vehicle platforms. At the same time, the engine family must also meet the 
contemporary fuel consumption standards, emission standards and output power levels. 
The company decided to set out a project to design and manufacture such an engine in 
Iran, named EF7. The target of the standard emission was EURO4, which is placed 
among the strict standards of emission in the car industry. In addition, the engine is 
supposed to use CNG as the primary fuel instead of petrol. CNG is perceived as a cleaner 
fuel with less pollution than petrol. Furthermore, although Iran has several petrol refining 
plants, there is under-capacity in domestic petrol refining and a huge amount of petrol is 
imported to fill the domestic demands. This is why the government generally wrestles in 
vain with a rising rate of petrol imports each year. In contrast, Iran has plentiful natural 
gas resources, which will allow for a substantial reduction in petrol imports. Therefore, 
the promotion of CNG based engines is a strategy that is expected to reduce petrol 
imports and encourage economic growth. 
The EF7 project began in 2004 and was a collaborative research and development 
(R&D) project between Iran-Khodro and one of Germany’s leading companies in engine 
design technology. Iran-Khodro has a supplier network comprising of many local and 
foreign suppliers. One of the targets of the EF7 project was the technological growth of 
local suppliers, in terms of designing knowledge, as well as production capability and 
hence the priority of the project was to supply engine parts locally as much as possible 
(this is discussed further in the next section). This procurement policy meant that during 
EF7, local suppliers began to retrofit their production lines to survive in the competition 
otherwise the required parts and components would be provided by foreign suppliers. 
Iran-Khodro’s supplier handling department has had relationships with engaged suppliers 
and is well aware of their organisations and manufacturing capabilities. The project 
managers provided an opportunity for their most reliable suppliers to implement technical 
changes and to adapt their products to meet required quality standards. Indeed, at the 
early stages of the project, Iran-Khodro defined a deadline for the suppliers to upgrade 
their production lines and build the capabilities to produce the engine parts. In these 
circumstances, the domestic suppliers should not only deliver the parts according to the 
project time-plan but they should also, inevitably, upgrade their manufacturing 
capabilities as well as their production equipment. Accordingly, the suppliers initiated to 
acquire technological knowledge from foreign (mostly European) suppliers through 
collaboration agreements. Therefore, both the main car manufacturing company and 
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related suppliers were involved in the technology acquisition processes. Such a broad 
technology transfer can initiate severe economic debates such as capital equipment and 
knowledge creation among domestic parties. However, there were many factors 
influencing this process at macro, meso and micro levels. This study will focus on the 
important external factors which shaped the interacting context. 
4 Political factors 
4.1 Political sanctions 
From 1996, when the D’Amato Act legislated against Iran, the country faced increasing 
challenges in international interactions and, in particular, in technology transfer projects. 
The D’Amato Act purports to limit access to Iran and the transfer of advanced 
technologies by limiting the development of Iran’s ability to explore for, extract, refine, 
or transport by pipeline petroleum resources. This sanction not only limits US firms’ 
business scopes but also allows the US Government to withhold US financing and 
contracts from foreign companies that trade with Iran. Sanction circumstances were 
initiated by forbidding the transfer of strategic high technologies. Such an embargo 
gradually affected domestic industrial companies when they procure high-technology 
embedded goods internationally. Iran-Khodro as a state-owned car company was among 
those striving to cope with this hardship. The company procures its parts from a network 
of its own suppliers including domestic and foreign suppliers. The relationship between 
the company and its foreign suppliers was based on economic benefit, technology 
requirements and trust. However, the crisis caused some foreign suppliers to become 
reluctant to sell the products due to international credibility. For a long time the company 
was able to procure parts from abroad but foreign companies, due to existing high 
political risk, began to supply the parts at higher costs. The negotiation process between 
domestic firms and foreign companies was much more difficult when the local company 
interested in transferring know-how and technological capabilities. One of the 
interviewees in this research comments that: 
“It is really difficult to enter into the negotiation process with foreign 
companies when they are aware that your country is under embargo. Our 
company must clarify to the foreign company that such a technology will be 
used only for peaceful purposes. This weakens your bargaining power 
particularly when you want to acquire the knowledge. It will be much more 
difficult when you are aware about the challenges of your suppliers in 
transferring equipment/technology from foreign suppliers”. 
International sanctions have also influenced the decisions of policy makers. Parliament 
tried to push local firms into acquiring technological knowledge as fast as possible by 
legislating deadlines to reduce/eliminate import tariffs for local firms. Furthermore, 
Iranian parliament has gradually discouraged high levels of state intervention and 
encouraged an open door policy for the import of cars manufactured abroad. It is believed 
that this new policy orientation can bring about greater competition in the domestic car 
market, leading to the production of higher quality cars domestically (Amoli and 
Shamsavari, 2006). This crisis seems to be similar to the case of the Korean car 
companies, not in inter-organisational forms, but in government level intervention. In the 
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1970s and 1980s the Korean government imposed a crisis by asking the domestic car 
companies “to shift from assembly production of foreign cars on a CKD basis to the 
development of locally designed ‘Korean’ cars” [Kim, (1998), p.511], then to increase 
production capacity and finally, acquiring technological capabilities (Kim, 1998). The 
established principles in Korea have many similar aspects to the Iranian government 
policies in the protection of the local market from new entrants and from new foreign 
knock-down imports and also a significant tax reduction. Nevertheless, in recent years, 
the parliament as well as the government seems to be unhappy with the trend of the 
technological capability growth by domestic firms and hence they have initiated an open 
door policy to make a crisis for the domestic firms to hasten the catching-up process. The 
state’s carrot and stick approach, forced IKCO Company to firstly enhance its 
technological capabilities by technology transfer from North companies and secondly, to 
help its domestic suppliers to upgrade their production lines as well as technological 
knowledge through setting up of new international R&D contracts. It also developed new 
products for its current market. However, in this study we do not evaluate technology 
transfer projects but the influences of external factors. 
Therefore, with the emergence of new political circumstances, in the government and 
local companies, the self-reliance type of doctrines dominated. The term ‘self-reliance’ 
refers to the policy of supplying the parts locally as much as possible with the minimum 
dependency on foreign sources. This self-reliance policy has some aspects which are 
worth discussing here. The positive elements are: the degree of enthusiasm and energy 
devoted to nation building and acquiring technology as much as possible with the great 
motivation of local parties. In contrast, the negative effects are: the insularity and 
potential for waste in not making use of experience from abroad or in over-protecting 
domestic elements (and thus causing them to be parochial and local monopolies). 
However, Iran-Khodro managers and state authorities perceive the EF7 project as an 
opportunity to compensate for the negative side of the self-reliance doctrine in the 
automotive industry. 
The politicised context has also affected the North companies. Interacting with a 
South company, which is under international sanctions, incurs taking a high risk in terms 
of financial issues and international credibility. Furthermore, since the host country’s 
state-level authorities follow-up the technology transfer project, some intervention by 
politicians in the decisions of the host country’s firm is inevitable. Such an intervention 
makes the decision making process unstable and difficult to manage for the North 
companies’ managers. 
Hence, the particular political situation affected the technology transfer process. On 
the one hand the host firm was determined to acquire engine design technology especially 
design capabilities and upgrade its local supplier by connecting them to European 
suppliers. On the other hand, the state organisations, which we will discuss in the next 
section, chase the project issues and progress. The finding confirms Seddiqi (1990) who 
argues that the status of political relations between countries plays a significant role to an 
extent to which high technology is likely to be transferred between them. 
4.2 Political economic factors 
Iran possesses 11.2% of all the oil reserves in the world and ranks as the second biggest 
country among oil reserves countries, while the figure for oil production is 5.4% of the 
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oil market (BP Statistical Review, 2008). Despite such oil production and export, that is 
vital for the country’s economy, there is an under-capacity in domestic petrol refining and 
a huge amount of petrol is imported to fill domestic demands. Iran imported more than  
20 million litres of petrol each day in the fiscal year (21 March 2006–20 March 2007) 
which was worth more than five billion dollars (Sanati, 2007). The budget law, legislated 
by the Iranian parliament, for the last fiscal year (21 March 2007–20 March 2008) allows 
the government to import only 2.5 billion dollars worth of petrol. There was, however, a 
petrol import budget deficiency of 2.5 billion dollars for the last fiscal year (Sanati, 2008) 
which is why the government generally wrestles in vain with a rising rate of petrol 
imports each year. 
In contrast, Iran has plentiful natural gas resources, which will allow for a substantial 
reduction in petrol imports. Iran has 15.7% of all the natural gas reserves in the world  
and ranks as the second biggest country among natural gas reserves countries while the 
figure for production is 3.8% of the natural gas market which ranks the country fourth in 
the world (BP Statistical Review, 2008). Compared to petrol, CNG does not need to 
establish massive and capital-intensive refinery plants as infrastructure. Despite the 
shortage of CNG stations in Iran, the local firms are able to invest and supply the local 
market. 
Another comparison between petrol and CNG relates to the customer choice in  
terms of the price of both fuels. Table 1 compares the fuel costs (petrol and CNG)  
for a typical vehicle in Iran. The prices are the subsidised prices ratified by the  
parliament and government. A typical vehicle in Iran, with its 90 km/h speed-limit on  
its highways, consumed 13.8 litres of petrol consumption over 200 km. Under the  
same conditions, only 12.3 kg of CNG would be consumed. The price of petrol in  
Iran in 2008 was $0.1 per litre, while the price of CNG was about $0.0215 per kg  
(data valid in 2008). Accordingly, the cost of fuel for over 20,000 km would be less  
than one-fifth the cost of petrol. The importance of CNG-based engines in Iran is  
further clarified when we note the recent fuel rationing policy. The government  
began rationing fuel in July 2008, allowing each vehicle to consume only 100 litres of 
petrol per month using the subsidised prices. Further consumption requires petrol to be 
bought using unsubsidised prices, which are four to seven times the subsidised ones. In 
Iran, the petrol price is a fixed price and does not vary with the fluctuation of global oil 
prices. Each fiscal year the government examines its budget and expenses and 
accordingly ratifies the price of petrol. However, the subsidised prices lead to some 
economic hardships for the government. In 2006, more than a quarter of the government 
subsidies in the energy sector went to petrol consumed by vehicles. Hence, the  
state strongly supports, both in moral and financial terms, any projects in the  
automotive industry that will remove these high subsidies and corresponding budget 
deficiencies. 
Table 1 Comparison of petrol and CNG costs in Iran as alternative fuels for vehicles (2008) 
Fuel type Cost Fuel consumption in 200 km 
Cost of 200 km 
traversal 
Cost of 20,000 km 
traversal 
Petrol $0.1 per litre 13.8 litre $1.38 $1,380 
CNG $0.0215 per Kg CNG 12.3 Kg $0.2625 $262.5 
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5 Environmental determinants 
Vehicles are the main source of air pollutants in Tehran and hence Iran’s Department of 
Environment has been trying to regulate the rules to diminish air pollution as much as 
possible. As one of the top organisations in Iran, the Department is responsive to the car 
industry and has set up many programmes to improve quality of life which is an urgent 
issue in Tehran. In these circumstances, the Department encourages (or at least does not 
punish) car companies to develop engine vehicles with other alternative clean fuels. Since 
CNG is a cleaner fuel than petrol and it is easy to reach the standard levels by a  
CNG-based engine, the EF7 project had the sympathy of environmentalists in Iran. 
Similarly, the Iranian fuel Conservation Company was assigned to make and monitor fuel 
policies. This company has prioritised the development of CNG-based engines in the 
country and gives incentives to the private sector to build CNG stations. Although many 
big cities are equipped with CNG stations, there is a considerable gap in CNG stations 
compared to petrol. Furthermore, this company offers financial support for domestic car 
companies in order to develop and manufacture CNG-based engines. 
Therefore, EF7, as a technology transfer project, was influenced by 
environmentalists. Although the influence was positive and had moral support of other 
state-level authorities, the managers were concerned over the future trend of regulations. 
One of the interviewees believes that: 
“Although we were quite sure that the project will successfully pass the current 
environmental regulations, we are still concerned over the growing strict 
environmental laws as the future uncertainties. We have to predict the 
upcoming environmental laws and regulations as they are vital in the future 
competition”. 
6 Innovation system in the case study: North-South contrasts 
As described previously, due to political, economical and environmental reasons, the 
actors in the Iranian side were not just the Iran-Khodro Company but also other meso and 
macro level actors. Automotive industry promotion is one of the state’s priorities 
particularly those which accord with the state fuel consumption policy. In line with this 
strategy, the state has provided some incentives as well as some crises for domestic car 
companies. It is argued that the CNG-based engine technology is at national level in Iran 
and the state level organisations including: the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Oil, 
Iranian Department of Environment, Iranian fuel Conservation Company, and the 
industry committee of the parliament are the major actors in the technology transfer 
project. If the technology innovation system of this project is mapped in accordance with 
the agent-based model4 (Nelson, 1993), it will be shown that the system is at a national 
level in Iran. Figure 2 illustrates the innovation system CNG engine technology in Iran. 
In contrast, the figure is not the same for Germany. In German national innovation 
system (where the export performance of its economy makes it a special case) research 
oriented universities combine their educational function with the advancement of 
scientific knowledge (Keck, 1993). Also within German universities, mechanical 
engineering is the largest discipline with a research budget of DM 652 mio (Krahmer and 
Schmoch, 1998). This discipline is very much close to the car industry both in production 
and R&D. According to a survey study at German universities by Krahmer and Schmoch 
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(1998), the central linking element in the cooperation between universities and industrial 
firms (for all fields) is the exchange of knowledge in both directions. Although the 
institutional orientation of academic and industrial researchers is different, the exchange 
of knowledge can be considered a common denominator where both interests meet. In the 
case of Iran’s CNG project, the transferor company has a very close relationship with the 
local university on one side, and the industry companies on the other. The observed 
company not only actively implemented research for German industry demands, but also 
actively expanded its technological knowledge as an export. In this technology transfer 
project, the German company designed and developed CNG-based technology for an 
Iranian context and although the knowledge of the firm grew through this project, such a 
technology is not workable in a German context. Germany prefers to have diesel-based 
engine vehicles instead of CNG, because of the economic issues of imports, refinery, and 
infrastructure of distribution of both fuels. The German state also has no interest in 
diffusing CNG-based engine technology. The only actor of this innovation was the 
German firm and, hence such an innovation system is at firm level in Germany. This 
paper does not focus on this issue but would suggest for future research to study how the 
innovation system levels might differ within cross-borders. 
Figure 2 Agent-based model of innovation system for CNG engine technology in Iran 
 
7 Intellectual property issues: a North-South debate? 
North companies often question the strength or weakness of Intellectual Property  
Rights (IPR) regimes in the South before transferring technology. Mansfield  
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influences the composition and extent of US direct investment in that country,  
although the size of the effects seems to differ greatly from industry to industry.  
There has been a wide range of perspectives about the effect of the host country’s  
IPR regimes in transferring technology from the North. Positive views perceived the 
strength of IPR regimes as an incentive for North countries to invest in the South 
(Phillips and Firth, 1990; Bhat, 1996). Skeptical views point to insufficient and 
contradictory empirical evidence on linkages between IPR and investment and 
technology flows (UNCTC, 1990), while the opposing views believe that strong IPR 
protection will be too costly and that the costs are unlikely to be justified by inward 
technology flows (Ringo, 1994). 
The Iranian national engine project was aimed at designing an engine for Iran with 
Iran-Khodro ownership in which the whole intellectual property rights of the engine 
belonged to Iran-Khodro. It meant that no company was allowed to copy any design 
feature in detail or any design detail of this engine without the permission of the  
Iran-Khodro Company. The prominent feature of this engine was that it was the first  
bi-fuel engine in the world ‘optimised’ for CNG operation as the primary fuel and petrol 
as the secondary fuel. The question and concern of Iranian managers relates to the 
protection of intellectual property rights of this engine. Despite the Iranian government’s 
recent challenges, the country has not yet joined the WTO and consequently, it is  
not a member of the TRIPS agreement yet. This circumstance may threaten the engine in 
terms of copy or reproduction in the international market and it will be very difficult for 
the international judiciary office to support the engine patent rights in the case of 
infringement or copying in design. The concern of the domestic firm seems  
slightly unusual in the existing technology transfer literature. In most technology  
transfer studies, the protection of the IPR of the technology is a serious concern  
of transferor rather than transferee. However, in the case of Iran’s national engine  
project the issue was totally different due to the special type of technology  
transfer contract in which the intellectual property right of the product belonged to  
the domestic firm. Hence, the foreign firm had not the apprehension of copying, 
reproducing or infringement of the new product in the domestic or even in the 
international markets. Nevertheless, on the other side of the coin, such concern was the 
case for involved European suppliers of the engine parts particularly for those  
who developed/designed the new parts. There were a few parts in the engine as  
the patents of European suppliers, and neither German firm nor Iran-Khodro was allowed 
to change the design. Although Iran-Khodro had the right to use the alternative  
parts in the engine, the intellectual property rights of a few parts, belonged to the 
suppliers who had firstly designed and developed them. In the EF7 project, those 
European suppliers insisted on establishing clear and strict contractual terms in their 
collaboration with the domestic suppliers. In fact, due to the IPR status in Iran, those 
suppliers requested having legal guarantees to protect their technology against any 
infringement and copying. These circumstances sometimes postponed parts procurement 
in the project and the managers perceived it as a negative factor. One of the interviewees 
commented that: 
“The oil pump of EF7 engine is a high-tech and patented part. We had some 
difficulties in its procurement. The German supplier was reluctant to work with 
our domestic supplier due to low technological capital equipment of our 
domestic supplier as well as lack of clear IPR institutions in the contracts. 
These two factors shifted the project timelines several times.” 
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8 Research limitations 
Cultural proximity is one of the significant influencing factors in shaping the interaction 
context between transferee and transferor. “The greater the cultural proximity between 
technology developer and users, the more likely there will be successful product/process 
application” [Gibson and Smilor, (1991), p.304]. Expanding the number and diversity of 
people interacting in technology transfer process is occasionally suggested in order to 
increase mutual understanding of values, attitudes and to minimise the cultural 
differences. Despite the cultural distance between transferee and transferor in the EF7 
project, this study did not consider the influence of this factor. We would suggest to 
future researchers to study the influence of cultural factors with the approach of North 
and South differences. We favour case studies that enable the researcher to achieve an  
in-depth understanding of the dynamics of the interactions between indigenous  
and overseas capabilities. We also encourage researchers from many disciplines to 
investigate the role of the influencing factors in the technological catching-up of a 
latecomer firm.  
9 Conclusions 
International technology transfer projects frequently occur in a complex and dynamic 
context and embed an extensive range of influencing factors that are present 
simultaneously – they might be beyond the will or power of both transferor and transferee 
management – and that has to be recognised and managed. There is an increasing trend in 
technology transfer studies to highlight that the process does not occur in an isolated 
context, in which only two sides’ firms are involved, but that the context is shaped by 
many political, cultural, social and macro economic factors. 
Recent evidence, as an in-depth case study analysis, would argue that the North-South 
technology transfer process is substantially influenced by various external institutions, 
international rules, and political factors. This study showed that those externalities may 
hamper or hasten technological acquisition of a latecomer firm. It also showed how the 
engaged actors of both sides may come from different levels of state, industry and firms. 
Lack of awareness of these influencing factors not only jeopardises the project’s 
progress, but also incurs negative consequences in the knowledge acquisition of the host 
country’s firm. Although out of control, the managers of both sides should be well aware 
of the dynamics of interacting context in order to manage the influences of external 
factors in the process effectively. 
This study reveals, on one hand, major differences in the North-South contextual 
contrasts, and on the other the special context of Iran in the process that might be the case 
for other developing countries. While some questions remain, the study suggests  
a dynamic perspective approach for helping to understand the interacting context of 
North-South companies. The article outlines some new research directions and by 
analysing external factors in North-South technology transfer projects, the study suggests 
for future studies to focus on the interaction processes between local capabilities and 
foreign technology sources. 
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Notes 
1 The two first drafts of this paper entitled ‘How might the level of innovation system differ 
within cross-borders? Evidence from catching-up process’ have been presented and published 
at the 5th International Symposium on Management of Technology (ISMOT’07), China,  
1–3 June, 2007, and as a discussion paper (2008) at Kingston University, UK. 
2 In the technology transfer literature, the term ‘North’ means developed countries and ‘South’ 
means developing or less developed countries. 
3 They differentiate among developing countries in terms of stage of development, size of 
economy, resource endowment, and so forth. 
4 In this model, the key interaction involved between component and system producers, 
upstream and downstream firms, universities and industry, and government agencies and 
universities and industries are considered. 
